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I. Introduction
Macroeconomic studies on money demand using stock-adjustment models
typically find extremely low rates of adjustment, with 10-20 percent rates of
annual convergence towards target being the rule, rather than the exception
(e.g. Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990; Fase and Winder, 1993). One reading of this
evidence is that firms do not manage liquidity holdings. Another reading of
the evidence is that aggregate analysis of corporate liquidity management is
inappropriate. In that regard, Swamy et al. (1982) already demonstrate that
aggregation issues may be at the root of slow rates of observed adjustment in
money demand studies.
One way out of this problem is to focus on firm-level liquidity holdings.
On the firm level, an important precautionary motive for corporate liquidity
holdings stems from informational problems between firms and capital
markets, which vary across firms.1 Consequently, the assumption in aggregate
analyses that all firms are homogeneous in the liquidity targets that they pursue,
is misleading. As a corollary, corporate liquidity targets and concomitant rates
of target convergence should be analysed at the appropriate level of
aggregation, i.e. the firm level.
In the present paper, we do exactly that. Specifically, using firm-level data
for the Netherlands, we assume a simple error correction model of corporate
liquidity holdings. In it, changes in liquidity holdings are driven by short-run
shocks to earnings and expenses as well as by the adjustment of liquidity
holdings towards the specified target. The ultimate goal of the paper is to
accurately estimate the speed of adjustment of liquidity holdings towards
targeted levels. In our view, this adjustment speed is the best indicator of the
practical relevance of liquidity targets to firms. Our main result is that
meaningful rates of convergence of corporate liquidity holdings towards
targeted levels are obtained only when liquidity targets are specified accurately.
Specifically, we demonstrate that the speed of adjustment is faster when we
1 Kim et al. (1998) focus on the cost of external finance; Opler et al. (1999) emphasize
asymmetric information in a broad sense; Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) examine the
influence of a bank-based versus a market-based economic environment; and Dittmar et
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include more firm-specific information in the target. In addition, we show
that convergence is faster on time-varying liquidity targets than on simple
historical (sector) averages. This all indicates that inaccurately measured
corporate liquidity targets correspond with downward biases in the observed
speed of target convergence. It also strongly suggests that the slow observed
speeds of adjustment in macro studies on money demand are artefacts of
aggregation bias.2
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II provides a theoretical
exposition of the determinants of firm-level liquidity holdings. Informational
problems between firms and capital markets feature prominently in this
discussion. Section III presents the data and illustrates the development over
time and the dispersion across firms and sectors of corporate liquidity holdings.
In section IV we analyse liquidity adjustment in two steps. In the first step we
construct the liquidity targets and in the second step we examine the rate of
convergence towards these targets from out-of-equilibrium positions. Section
V concludes.
II. The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity
We start with an outline of what drives firm-level liquidity holdings. In
this respect, we first discuss the determinants of optimal corporate holdings
of liquid assets, being transaction costs, opportunity costs and informational
asymmetries. Together these factors yield an optimum liquidity level or ratio,
which we label the static trade off level, following Opler et al. (1999).
Subsequently, we turn to another branch of the literature, where liquidity
holdings are assumed to take the back seat when other financial decisions are
taken in the firm. Such passive adjustment of corporate liquidity holdings
may reflect pecking order behaviour in finance and the absence of any actively
pursued liquidity target, but also it may reflect the buffer stock property of
liquidity in the short-run only and a longer-term return to a target.
2 As such our lesson in aggregation corroborates with the case made in for instance the
inventory investment literature. See for example Bivin (1994) for a theoretical model and
Seitz (1993) for supportive evidence on German micro-data in this regard.198 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
A. Transaction and Opportunity Costs
The presence of positive transaction costs alone is sufficient to create a
positive demand for liquidity. With zero opportunity costs, optimal holdings
of corporate liquidity are unbounded. When opportunity costs are positive,
however, firms will economize on liquidity holdings. Transaction and
opportunity costs together then determine a positive and finite optimal amount
of corporate liquidity holdings. In applied work, often used variables to capture
the transaction motive are sales, in an inventory approach, or assets, in a
Keynesian or portfolio framework (Opler et al., 1999). A benchmark interest
rate then is generally assumed to account for the opportunity cost of holding
liquid assets. More generally, all relevant substitutes for liquidity like for
instance net working capital and minority holdings in other firms may need
to be taken into account.
In addition, a precautionary demand for money may exist. One argument
is the expectation of future investment opportunities. A second argument
concerns uncertainty regarding future cash inflows and outflows. In particular,
firms characterised by a more volatile cash flow history will desire a larger
precautionary stock of liquidity. Third, firms with large amounts of short term
debt possibly face a larger degree of refinancing uncertainty (Holmström and
Tirole, 2000). This last factor is closely related to the informational motives
for holding liquidity. The relation stems from the fact that refinancing becomes
more uncertain when there is a possibility that future debt rollovers are denied.
We turn to this issue now.
B. Informational Problems
According to Holmström and Tirole (1998), asymmetric information
problems between firms and financial markets raise the difficulty and cost of
obtaining external finance and hence create a (precautionary) demand for
corporate liquidity.3 De Haan (1997) finds supportive evidence for this
3 Firms with the most severe information problems may also face greater problems acquiring
long-term debt and instead need to rely on less reliable short-term debt as in Diamond
(1991a), which by itself stimulates a higher precautionary demand for liquidity (Holmström
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hypothesis examining Dutch corporate liquidity holdings through a survey
questionnaire. We label this effect the informational cost of external finance.
It can occur through firm specific characteristics, but also through sector and
time specific factors.
An example of a firm-specific characteristic is the amount of leverage. In
general, higher leverage increases moral hazard and thus the marginal cost of
debt, see Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Hubbard (1998). With higher leverage,
a firm then faces a higher degree of uncertainty regarding future access to
debt financing and desires higher precautionary liquidity holdings.4 This
theoretical consideration is in line with empirical findings of De Haan (1997)
and Van Ees et al. (1998) who, for a sample of Dutch firms, find that a debt-
constraint augmented model of investment outperforms a neo-classical
specification. Another example is the informational sensitivity of a firm’s
activities.  Investment in research and development (R&D), for instance, is
likely to be subject to stronger asymmetries in information than investment in
manufacturing plants and equipment (e.g. Opler et  al., 1999).
Sector and time specific factors may add to this. Investment in the
information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors may be more
sensitive to asymmetric information than investment in the manufacturing
sector (cf. Chirinko and Schaller, 1995). Similarly, investment in recessions
may exhibit a higher informational sensitivity compared to investment in
booms (cf. Calomiris et al., 1994).
Another form of informational asymmetries potentially affecting liquidity
holdings arises from the existence of agency problems between management
and owners of a firm. Managers may value corporate liquidity more than
owners and thus desire higher liquidity targets for a number of reasons. First,
management may be overly concerned with liquidation risk, whereas
shareholders can more easily diversify and so reduce the impact of a single
bankruptcy on their portfolio return. Shareholders therefore likely put more
emphasis on profits and hence prefer lower levels of precautionary liquidity.
4 Myers and Rajan (1998) on the other hand suggest that higher liquidity may worsen the
information problem rather than cure it. In that case, the cost of external finance may
increase with liquidity holdings.200 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Second, managers may be empire builders rather than profit maximisers.
Empire builders value projects that add to the size of the firm without
necessarily being profitable. As the market does not value such projects, empire
builders prefer a precautionary amount of liquidity that allows them to exploit
empire building investment opportunities.5 Third, management may also value
liquidity more than shareholders do simply because it can be freely spent on
perquisites. In line with this, Dittmar et al. (2003) empirically demonstrate
that in economic environments with low power for the owners of the firm, the
firm’s management will hold more cash.
Corporate liquidity holdings will therefore generally increase with
managerial discretion. The costs of managerial discretion will be lower, the
more a firm is subject to monitoring and the disciplining forces of the (capital)
markets. To the extent that relationships with financial intermediaries induce
information production and monitoring activities (cf. Diamond 1984, 1991b),
managerial discretion is limited and corporate liquidity holdings will be
reduced.6 Thus we may expect that higher leverage leads to lower levels of
liquidity through the monitoring channel. Moreover, strong bank relations
may cause a firm to feel comfortable with lower levels of precautionary
liquidity simply because banks are critical providers of liquidity especially
when the market develops unfavourably (e.g. Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).7
On the other hand, Macey and Miller (1997) hypothesize that banks may try
to reduce corporate risk taking and desire the firm to hold high levels of
precautionary liquidity. Hence a bank-based system – as is the Dutch one –
may stimulate large holdings of corporate liquidity. Pinkowitz and Williamson
5 See Freixas and Rochet (1997, particularly pp. 125-129).
6 Other factors may impact on managerial discretion as well. Dispersed ownership, size of
the firm and charter amendments may act as takeover deterrents. This lowers capital market
discipline and therefore, all else equal, raises corporate liquidity holdings.
7 This argument counteracts the earlier hypothesis that higher leverage leads to higher
liquidity holdings due to refinancing uncertainty (cf. Holmström and Tirole, 1997). However,
we note that the monitoring and information production effects stemming from long term
debt are probably larger than those stemming from short maturities (e.g. Diamond 1991a;
Freixas and Rochet, 1997) so that our earlier conjecture remains unambiguous when related
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(2001) document empirical support for this hypothesis in the case of Japan
and to a lesser extent for Germany.
C. Passive Adjustment and Buffer Stock Liquidity
In contrast to the static trade off view on corporate liquidity demand is the
view where liquidity is passively drifting along on the waves of fortune of the
firm. In this passive adjustment view on corporate liquidity holdings, firms
care little about the amount of liquidity that is reported in their balance sheets.
Effectively, therefore, corporate liquidity holdings are in the back seat when
the firm decides for instance on its optimal capital structure or its dividend
payout rate. While such a view is not directly following from for example the
strict pecking order theory – which focuses on the passive adjustment of capital
structure in general and net debt in particular (e.g. Myers and Majluf, 1984) –
it is consistent with such theory.8 Pecking order behaviour in its most extreme
form implies that firms extract all expenses (investment in fixed assets and
working capital, debt repayments, dividend payments, and so on) in excess of
revenues (cash flow, new debt, sale of fixed assets or working capital) from
stocks of liquid assets before turning to external sources of funding.9 De
Haan and Hinloopen (2003) present evidence that suggests that pecking order
arguments are relevant determinants of Dutch corporate capital structure
adjustments.
Closely related to this concept is the theory of buffer stock liquidity (e.g.
Carr and Darby,  1981). According to the latter, firms may initially choose to
8 In theory, liquidity targets may also be absent if a firm has an optimal capital structure
which is cast in the form of a net debt target, see Opler et al. (1999).
9 Nevertheless, even among the supporters of the pecking order theory it is recognized that
“slack [i.e. liquidity] has value” (Myers and Majluf, 1984, p. 195). At the same time, the
realization that slack has value does not imply that the basic pecking order story includes
active management of corporate liquidity holdings. Specifically, Myers (1984) states that
whenever internally-generated cash flow is less than investment outlays “the firm first
draws down its cash balance or marketable securities portfolio. [When] it is more, the
firm first pays off debt or invests in cash or marketable securities” (Myers 1984, p. 581).
Thus liquidity holdings adjust passively to the discrepancy between cash inflows and
(investment) expenditures.202 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
let their liquidity holdings absorb any shocks, while only in the longer term
trying to return to an optimal level of corporate liquidity. Note that buffer
stock liquidity does not necessarily assume that firms are unaware of the
benefits and costs of corporate liquidity. A sufficient condition is that the
firm stresses other financial targets more than it does liquidity holdings, at
least in the short run. De Haan et al. (1994) find that for Dutch firms corporate
liquidity holdings exhibit distinct elements of a buffer stock approach while
at the same time elements of pecking order behaviour characterize capital
structure adjustment.
Summarizing the above, we conclude that an exclusive focus on short-run
liquidity adjustment to shocks only is insufficient to distinguish between the
absence and presence of long-run liquidity targets. This problem arises due
to the observational equivalence in the short-run between buffer stock
adjustment on the one hand and pure passive liquidity adjustment on the other.
Consequently, we first need a characterization of equilibrium liquidity holdings
in the long run. Subsequently, we can assess the short-term adjustment
processes towards the long-run targets.
III. Data and Variable Definition
A. Data Structure
The data used for the empirical testing of our corporate liquidity holdings
framework is derived from Statistics Netherlands’ data on the Finances of
Large Firms (SFGO) covering the period 1977-1997. The SFGO provides
company specific financial information at the level of balance sheet and income
statement items for all large Dutch non-financial firms.10 On an annual basis,
the data cover 80 to 90 percent of the population. Occasionally, firms do not
10 The size requirement for inclusion in the SFGO is a balance sheet length of at least 20
million Dutch guilders. Furthermore, Statistics Netherlands removes from a firm’s financial
statements any impact that financial segments have. Unfortunately, the data do not record
which firms contain such financial segments. Otherwise, we might have exploited this
information as a proxy for the ease with which firms can exploit internal capital markets,
mitigating the need for precautionary liquidity (e.g. Bruinshoofd et al., 2002).203 DUTCH CORPORATE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
report in a given year so that missing data entries arise. We only include firms
for which no missing data are observed.11
In the early years, the number of firms on which Statistics Netherlands
reports is quite small. Moreover, data then only cover the manufacturing sector.
Data on the services sector start becoming available in 1983 and coverage
increases substantially in the first years after. Therefore, we construct one
balanced panel that runs from 1986 to 1997 and contains 453 firms, of which
197 are manufacturing firms and 182 are services firms.12 We refer to this
panel as Panel1. Given the number of firms and their distribution over a wide
variety of economic sectors, this panel is particularly suited to identify cross-
sectional variation in corporate liquidity holdings. The expense lies in its
relatively short time dimension, which might affect results obtained in the
analysis of corporate liquidity dynamics, where the time series emphasis is
strongest. To check the robustness of our results in that regard, we construct
a second balanced panel that exploits fully the time dimension offered in the
SFGO. It runs from 1977 to 1997 and contains 84 firms, all of which are in
manufacturing sectors. We refer to this panel as Panel2.
B. Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the development of Dutch firm-level liquidity ratios across
11 In some cases, firms may leave due to financial distress raising the issue of survivorship
bias or because they drop below the threshold level of assets. However, in many other
cases firms don’t leave but simply do not report their financial statements to SFGO in one
or more years after which they return. We are unable to distinguish between these different
cases. Survivorship bias does not appear to be the major reason though.
12 Manufacturing firms are those in sectors II (Foods and goodies  industries, SBI93 15,
16),  III (Petrochemical industry, SBI93 23), IV (Chemical, rubber and synthetic materials
producing industries, SBI93 24, 25), V (Metals, machines and transports producing
industries, SBI93 27-35) and VI (Other industries, SBI93 17-22, 26, 36, 37). Services
firms are those in sectors IX (Wholesale and retail trade, SBI93 50-52), X (Hotel and
catering industry, SBI93 55), XI (Transportation, storage and communication, SBI93 60-
64) and XII (Real estate, personal property and commercial services, SBI93 70-74).
Miscellaneous firms are in sectors I (Agriculture, fishery and minerals, SBI93 1-14), VIII
(Construction industry, SBI93 45) and XIII (Public services, education, health care and
miscellaneous services, SBI93 75-93). Utilities firms (sector VII, SBI93 40, 41) are not
included in the analysis.204 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
sectors and over time. A few features catch the eye. First, the median liquidity
ratio in Panel1 (Figure 1.A) falls steadily over time, from roughly 5.5 per
cent in 1986 to about 3.5 percent in 1997. From Figure 1.B we note that
manufacturing firms contribute most to this decrease in liquidity holdings,
while for services firms the ratio remains more or less constant over time.13
In addition, we observe the strong dispersion of liquidity holdings across
firms, a feature of liquidity holdings that is not observable from aggregated
data. Second, the movement of the median liquidity ratio in Panel2 (Figure
1.B) also exhibits the downward trend in the late eighties and nineties, but
suggests that this may simply be a return to average following the substantial
increase in corporate liquidity holdings in the early eighties up to 1987.14 It
also shows that the downward trend over the common sample period 1986-
1997 is similar for Panel1 and Panel2. In addition, the manufacturing firms
in Panel2 typically have higher median liquidity ratios than their counterparts
in the shorter Panel1. Survivorship effects may account for this observation.
Third, we see that the median Dutch corporate liquidity ratio fluctuates between
2 and 6 percent, whereas Opler et al. (1999) and Pinkowitz and Williamson
(2001) report a median corporate liquidity ratio of 6 to 6.5 percent for US
firms. This observation is slightly surprising because the Netherlands is a
country with a predominantly bank-based financial system in combination
with low shareholder rights. In the literature both features are associated with
high liquidity holdings (see Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001 and Dittmar et
al., 2003). A potential explanation for our finding may be the fact that our
sample consists of large firms only.
For the remainder of this analysis, liquidity refers to the log of holdings of
liquid assets (cash, short term investments, term deposits and demand deposits)
13 A potential reason for the relatively high liquidity ratios of services firms is their stronger
intangibility of assets. However, Chirinko and Schaller (1995) suggest that the specificity
of manufacturing assets more than offsets their lower intangibility. This would lead us to
expect manufacturing firms to have the higher liquidity ratios.
14 Note that the national liquidity ratio had been on a rising trend since the early 1980s and
was perceived as being excessively high in the late 1980s (e.g. Kuipers and Boertje, 1988;
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A. Panel 1
B. Median Liquidity Ratios Compared
as a fraction of total assets less liquid assets. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics for Panel1 on liquidity holdings, asset structure (size, net working
capital, near liquidity), liability structure (total debt and short debt), flow of206 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Panel1
# Obs. 25th Median 75th Std.  dev. Order of
percentile percentile integ.
Liquidity ratio (%) 5,436 0.88 4.42 15.80 28.77 I(1)C,T
Liquidity 5,436 -4.735 -3.120 -1.845 2.110 I(1)C,T
Size 5,436 10.839 11.532 12.529 1.343 I(1)C,T
Net working capital 5,436 -0.075 0.045 0.173 0.237 I(0)C,T
Near liquidity 5,436 0.328 0.503 0.653 0.228 I(1)C,T
Total debt 5,436 0.381 0.529 0.669 0.201 I(1)C,T
Short debt 5,436 0.625 0.845 0.999 0.229 I(1)C,T
Investment 5,436 0.028 0.058 0.105 0.073 I(0)C,T
Return on assets 5,436 0.021 0.054 0.096 0.099 I(0)C,T
Earnings uncertainty 4,729 0.018 0.030 0.050 0.035 I(1)C,T
Average interest rate 5,436 0.018 0.041 0.064 0.115 I(1)C,T
Notes: Based on  453 firms, 1986-1997. Liquidity ratio (%) is cash and marketable securities
over net assets and liquidity is its logarithm; net assets is total assets less cash and marketable
securities; size is the logarithm of net assets expressed in 1990 prices; net working capital
is the sum of short term claims, inventories and work in progress less short term debt to net
assets; near liquidity is the ratio of short term claims, inventories and work in progress to
net assets; total debt is defined as total debt over total assets; short debt expresses short
term debt as a fraction of the sum of short and long term debt; investment is changes in
tangible fixed assets due to purchase or production over net assets; return on assets is
earnings after depreciation, interest, taxes and extraordinary gains and losses, but before
dividend payments to net assets; earnings uncertainty is the firm-specific five-year rolling
standard deviation of return on assets; average interest rate is interest expenses as a fraction
of total debt, excluding debts to subsidiary companies. We use I(0) and I(1) to signify that
a series is integrated of order zero and one, respectively, using the Harris and Tzavalis
(1999) test and a 95% level of confidence. The superscript C denotes that firm-specific
intercepts have been included in the test; the superscript T denotes the inclusion of a
common time trend. Also see Appendix 1.
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funds characteristics (investment, return on assets, earnings uncertainty),15
and the opportunity cost of holding liquidity (average interest rate).
We refer to the table for the exact definition of the variables and to the
next section for a discussion of their linkage with the theoretical arguments
on corporate liquidity management. Note that throughout the paper variable
names are in italics.
IV. Estimation Results
To integrate the long-run and short-run analysis of corporate liquidity
holdings, we hypothesize an error-correction specification of liquidity. In such
a specification, the dynamics of liquidity are determined by various short-run
shocks in addition to attempts to drive the actual liquidity level to the desired
long-run (static trade off) level. We start, therefore, with an empirical
investigation of the long-run determinants of corporate liquidity to arrive at
measures of long-run corporate liquidity targets. The two-step procedure also
allows us to consider unobserved firm specific factors in these targets and
their impact on restricted error correction. We need this measure of unobserved
heterogeneity to illustrate the relevance of aggregation bias in the analysis of
corporate liquidity holdings.
A. Computing Firm-level Corporate Liquidity Targets
Table 1 already contains statistical information about the long-run
characteristics of the different series used. Specifically, in the last column of
Table 1 the order of integration of the variables is indicated. Liquidity is shown
to be I(1), implying that the long-run level of liquidity is nonstationary.
Consequently, the long-run determinants of liquidity should be nonstationary
as well. The table shows that size, near liquidity, total debt, short debt, average
interest rate and earnings uncertainty all obey this condition and therefore
15 The construction of earnings uncertainty as a rolling five-year standard deviation results
in a loss of data points (453 times the first 5 return on assets observations per firm equals
2,265 data points). We have limited this loss by adding return on assets information for the
years 1981-1986 when available, conserving 1,558 data points.208 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
are potential long-run determinants of liquidity. In contrast, net working capital,
investment and return on assets16 are all I(0).
Direct estimates of long-run liquidity targets result from equation (1) where
liquidity (y) is regressed on xit and firm specific fixed effects hi.uit is white
noise, xit includes a constant, time and sector dummies and the potential long-
run determinants listed above plus return on assets and b denotes the vector
of corresponding parameter estimates.17
                                                   (1)
Based on equation (1) we distinguish three different types of targets. In
the subsequent analysis we compare the rates of target adjustment across
target definitions. First, we define as the ‘sophisticated’ liquidity targets the
predicted values from the estimated equation (1), 
' ˆ ˆ .
sophisticated
it it yx b = We argue
that the precision of the estimated sophisticated liquidity targets improves if
more relevant information regarding firm-level liquidity targets is included
in xit. We therefore vary the extent to which sector-specific features of liquidity
targets are controlled for. Specifically, we compute sophisticated targets at a
high (no sector dummies in equation (1)), a medium (1-digit sector dummies
included), or a low (2-digit sector dummies included) level of aggregation.
Our sophisticated liquidity targets may nevertheless leave considerable
unobserved heterogeneity in long-run firm-level liquidity levels. Although
our sophisticated targets computed at the medium and low levels of aggregation
may pick up some of this otherwise unobserved heterogeneity through the
16 Return on assets is essentially a measure of cash flow. It differs from the cash flow
variable in Opler et al. (1999), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) and Dittmar et al. (2003)
in that it assesses earnings after depreciation, but before dividends.
17 
Return on assets is included despite its I(0) character  both because of the limited power
of unit root tests in short panels (e.g., Baltagi and Kao, 2000) and because of its general
presence in the literature as explanatory variable for liquidity holdings (e.g., Opler et al.,
1999). Alternatively, we have computed all the adjustment results while excluding return
on assets as a long-run determinant of liquidity. Then short-run shocks to liquidity holdings
follow from the level of return on assets. The results are qualitatively similar. Net working
capital and investment were treated similarly, but lacked statistical significance in the long-
run equation.
'
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inclusion of sector dummies, even they likely do not capture all the firm-
specific considerations in the liquidity decision. Such firm-specific
considerations may refer to elements in (precautionary) liquidity demand not
captured by our explanatory variables. We do not control, for instance, for
the ownership structure of the firm or the extent to which the firm has access
to emergency lines of credit. Especially the part of liquidity targets that is
motivated by firm-specific information problems may remain opaque.
Within the main theme of this paper, if we fail to provide accurate measures
of corporate liquidity targets, we cannot hope to see firms converging rapidly
towards these targets. Therefore, we construct a separate set of  specific targets
that takes account of remaining unobserved heterogeneity in liquidity holdings.
Hence we define the specific targets as 
' ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ .
specific sophisticated
it it i it i yy x hb h =+ = +
The role of  ˆi h in the firm-specific target is to capture all firm-specific motives
feeding into optimal cash targets not captured by the sophisticated target.
Note the resemblance of our approach with the way that debt targets have
been computed in the capital structure literature (e.g. Auerbach, 1985; Shyam-
Sunder and Myers,1999). As with the sophisticated targets, we compute
specific targets at the high, medium, and low level of aggregation.
Lastly, we use simple historical averages of liquidity ratios as benchmark
targets. Again, we compute these historical targets at a high, medium, and
low level of aggregation. The computational details are mentioned in Table 3
below.
B. Estimation Results
Now we turn to the estimation results of equation (1), as presented in
panel A of Table 2. The specifications vary in terms of the level of sectoral
aggregation reflected by the included sector dummies. For example, in column
1 estimates of equation (1) include no sector dummies at all (high level of
aggregation), while in column 3 a sector dummy is included for each 2-digit
sector (low level of aggregation).
Panel B of the table provides important information on these long-run
sophisticated liquidity targets. First, the order of integration of the predicted
values is 1, implying that our sophisticated liquidity targets are nonstationary.
Since the residuals are shown to be I(0) and – recall from Table 1 – liquidity210 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table 2. Level Estimates of Corporate Liquidity for Panel1
Panel A. Estimation results
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Size -0.058 -0.014 -0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Total debt -1.323 -1.634 -1.756
(0.156) (0.156) (0.157)
Short debt 0.770 0.668 0.698
(0.140) (0.143) (0.143)
Return on assets 4.455 4.389 4.108
(0.345) (0.333) (0.330)
Average interest rate -1.544 -1.344 -1.195
(0.246) (0.239) (0.235)
Earnings uncertainty 2.184 2.206 1.341
(0.858) (0.850) (0.851)
Sector dummies no 1-digit 2-digit
Panel B. Summary statistics
R2-adjusted 0.115 0.183 0.221
Order of int. prediction I(1)C,T I(1)C,T I(1)C,T
St. dev. prediction 0.725 0.915 1.014
Order of int. residual I(0)C I(0)C I(0)C
St. dev. residual 1.984 1.904 1.853
Notes: Fixed effects estimates of liquidity. Based on 4,729 observations (453 firms, 1986-
1997). All specifications include a constant term and year dummies. All variables are
defined as before in Table 1. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported
in parentheses. We use I(0) and I(1) to signify that a series is integrated of order zero and
one, respectively, using the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) test and a 95% level of confidence.
The superscript C denotes that firm-specific intercepts have been included in the test; the
superscript T denotes the inclusion of a common time trend. Also see Appendix I.211 DUTCH CORPORATE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
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The evidence is indirect, because it disregards for instance the cointegrating relationships
that may exist among the explanatory variables. Direct, multivariate tests on cointegration,
however, typically require T ® ¥  for consistency (e.g. Baltagi and Kao, 2000). Unit root
tests on the specific target and residual respectively lead to the same conclusion as for their
sophisticated counterparts: nonstationarity cannot be rejected for the target, while it can
for the residual.
19 The long-run relevance of liquidity substitutes has been explored by including near
liquidity. We find no statistical evidence that this variable explains variations in liquidity
holdings. One explanation is that inventories are actively managed themselves (see Seitz,
1993, for evidence for German firms). Then, inventories – which make up part of near
liquidity – cannot accommodate long-run swings in liquidity holdings.
is I(1), we have indirect evidence that liquidity is cointegrated with our
sophisticated targets.18 Hence the use of an error correction framework to
characterize corporate liquidity dynamics is justified.
Second, the degree of unobserved heterogeneity in liquidity holdings
strongly depends on the aggregation level at which the targets have been
computed. For example, compared to the specified model in column 1, with
targets computed at a high level of aggregation, the 
2 R nearly doubles when
targets are computed at a low level of aggregation (column 3). But even when
we compare the 
2 R in column 3 with that in column 2, with targets computed
at a medium level of aggregation, the explanatory power of the former is
larger by 21 percent. This observation applies to all sub-samples of Panel1 as
well as to Panel2 (cf. Appendix 2, Table A.1.).
We now briefly discuss the estimated coefficients of the long-run liquidity
equation. The average interest rate and earnings uncertainty probably capture
the direct costs and benefits of liquid assets holdings best. It should be noted
that the average interest rate is a very rough indicator of the theoretically
desired marginal opportunity cost of liquidity holdings as it considers total
interest payments on all loans in the balance sheet as a fraction of total debt.
As such it does not take into account differences in risk and maturity
characteristics between different loans. Nevertheless, the results indicate that
firms hold lower levels of liquidity – all else equal – when this is more costly
to do so, whereas stronger earnings variation feeds into higher (precautionary)
liquidity balances. Size in this regard captures any scale effect in liquidity
management.19 The negative parameter estimate shows that liquidity tends to
increase less than one for one with size. This scale effect seems to pick up212 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
sector-specific motives to hold liquidity, however, as it all but disappears
when sector-dummies are included in the model (columns 2 and onwards).
Estimates for the manufacturing, services, and miscellaneous firms separately
show that services firms are particularly sensitive to these direct motives to
hold liquid assets (see Bruinshoofd and Kool, 2004).
Informational aspects of the corporate liquidity decision are empirically
captured by total debt and short debt, representing the impact of leverage and
debt maturity structure. Holding constant the average cost of debt, larger total
debt implies lower liquidity. This observation supports the theoretical argument
that leverage captures creditors’ monitoring efforts (cf. Diamond, 1991b)
which may directly and indirectly reduce corporate liquidity holdings.20
Through the direct channel, monitoring reduces managerial discretion and
hence lowers liquidity. Indirectly, monitoring may reduce information
asymmetries and hence lower the risk premium on external finance, which
reduces the corporate demand for precautionary liquidity.21 This leverage effect
is conditional on the maturity structure, captured by the short term debt share
in total debt (short debt). Its positive parameter estimate implies that for any
given level of total debt, a lower average maturity (approximated by higher
short debt) increases liquidity. This effect lies probably closest to the
refinancing uncertainty that we conjectured to impact on the informational
cost of external finance.22 The results in Appendix 2, Table A.1. show that
manufacturing firms are particularly sensitive to total debt (and the average
20 The informational cost of external finance view predicts that higher leverage raises,
rather than lowers, the risk premium on external finance since higher leverage implies that
firms are closer to their debt capacities. This effect, if present, should be largely captured
by the average interest rate in our model.
21 Two additional explanations suggest that higher leverage ratios indicate better historical
access to debt and hence a reduced precautionary liquidity motive and/or self-restraining
management that prefers not to concern its creditors with high levels of liquidity when
leverage is high as well (cf. Myers and Rajan, 1998).
22 Note that increases in the level of short and long term debt alike have a negative impact
on liquidity holdings. For an increase in long term debt, through a higher total debt and
lower short debt, this effect is unambiguous. For an increase in short term debt, via a
negative effect through total debt and a positive effect through short debt, this result holds
at sample means and given the parameter estimates in Table 2.213 DUTCH CORPORATE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
interest rate, for that matter) in specifying their optimal liquidity holdings,
though the maturity structure seems to matter little. This conclusion applies
to manufacturing firms in Panel1 (panel A of Table A.1.) as well as those in
the longer Panel2 (panel B of Table A.1.).
Lastly, the estimation results demonstrate that return on assets is an
important determinant of liquidity holdings, which corroborates evidence in
for example Opler et al. (1999), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001), and Dittmar
et al. (2003).23 In terms of economic importance, we observe from the
estimation results in Table 2 and the descriptive statistics in Table 1 that an
increase in return on assets from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile
boosts liquidity (evaluated at the median) by more than 1.5 percentage points.
Table 3 summarizes the share of target variation and unexplained variation
across the three types of targets and three levels of aggregation. Comparing
the sophisticated targets with simple historical targets we observe from the
table that the former makes up a larger part of total variance, resulting in a
lower share of variance in the unexplained part  ˆ ˆ () ii t he + of liquidity holdings.
Hence our time-varying sophisticated targets are better equipped to capture
cross-sectional variation in liquidity holdings than are historical targets.
It also follows from Table 3 that the share of target variation strongly
increases when moving from sophisticated targets towards specific targets.
For the specific targets the unexplained variance now only consists of variance
in  ˆit e whereas the variance of  ˆi h is included in the target variance. Similarly,
the lower the level of aggregation at which historical and sophisticated targets
have been computed, the larger is the share of target variance in total variance
and the smaller the share of unexplained variance. For specific targets this
observation does not hold, as these targets essentially include firm-level effects
at all levels of aggregation.
C. Target Adjustment
The practical importance of corporate liquidity targets ultimately follows
23 The remaining estimated coefficients are qualitatively similar when return on assets is
excluded, see Bruinshoofd and Kool (2004).214 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS




Variance in targets 0.0 11.9 70.8
Unexplained variance 100.0 88.3 29.2
Variance in targets 7.0 18.9 70.8
Unexplained variance 93.0 81.1 29.2
Variance in targets 12.4 23.1 70.8
Unexplained variance 87.6 76.9 29.2
Notes: Based on the 4,729 observations in Panel1 (453 firms, 1986-1997) for which
sophisticated and specific targets could be computed. Total variance is 4.45. Historical
targets are computed as average observed liquidity holdings over time. At the high level of
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S2j indicates 2-digit sector j. Sophisticated targets are the predicted values from the
regressions reported in table 2, including return on assets. At the high level of aggregation,
no sector dummies are included in the regression (column 1 of table 2); at the medium
level of aggregation 1-digit sector dummies are included in the regression (column 2 of
table 2); at the low level of aggregation 2-digit sector dummies are included in the regression
(column 3 of table 2). Specific targets are constructed as sophisticated targets, but include






from the speed of adjustment towards these targets from out-of-equilibrium
positions. For the remainder of this section, we therefore shift attention to the
short-run dynamics of corporate liquidity holdings.
Within our error correction specification, various short-run shocks affect
liquidity holdings. When the net effect of these shocks is to push liquidity
holdings away from targeted levels, firms have incentives to adjust liquidity215 DUTCH CORPORATE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
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where Dyit denotes yit - yi,t-1 and y again represents liquidity. Sub(super)script
d is added to differentiate the elements in this dynamic equation from those
used in equation (1) above. Short-run pressure on liquidity holdings is partly
captured by the explained part 
' ,
d
di t x b with 
d
it x a vector of explanatory variables,
containing for example changes in the long-run liquidity determinants as well
as earnings and expenditure shocks. In addition, there is an unexplained part
d
it u to liquidity shocks, which is white noise. Last but not least,  ,1 ˆ
z
it a - captures
adjustment incentives in the form of start-of-year deviations from long-run
targets. Here z Î {historical, sophisticated, specific} indicates that the
historical, sophisticated, or specific targets have been used to compute the
adjustment incentive. The speed of adjustment towards the long-run target is
represented by gz.24
Table 4 presents the estimation results.25 Panel A of the table displays
estimates of equation (2) for Panel1. In columns 1 – 3 the historical,
sophisticated, and specific targets have been imposed alternately to compute
the  target  deviations,  but  the  level  of  aggregation  in specifying the targets
– defined as in Table 3 – is kept constant at the high level. Columns 4 – 6 and
7 – 9 are similar, but the level of aggregation in specifying the targets is
medium and low, respectively. Since the focus in the analysis of dynamic
liquidity is on target adjustment, we will postpone the discussion on the xd
included in the model and turn to the estimated gz first.
24  Dynamic stability requires gz 
< 0.
25 We discuss the restricted error correction estimates only. We have also estimated
unrestricted versions of equation (2) where lags of all long-run determinants of liquidity
targets are included separately. The implied long-run coefficients from unrestricted
estimation are broadly similar to the direct estimates of long-run liquidity determinants as
presented in Table 2. Moreover, the resulting estimates on short-run dynamics are very
similar to those obtained from the restricted estimation presented in Table 4. Adding lagged































Table 4. Target Adjustment in Corporate Liquidity Dynamics for Panel1
Panel A. Estimation results
Explanatory High level of aggregation Medium level of aggreg. Low level of aggregation
variables Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific
Target -0.21 -0.24 -0.68 -0.23 -0.26 -0.68 -0.24 -0.28 -0.68
deviationt-1 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
D return on 1.65 2.15 2.77 1.64 2.18 2.77 1.64 2.18 2.70
assetst (0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21)
D sizet -1.37 -1.42 -1.15 -1.36 -1.41 -1.15 -1.35 -1.41 -1.15
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
D average -0.33 -0.52 -0.74 -0.31 -0.48 -0.67 -0.30 -0.46 -0.62







































Table 4. (Continued) Target Adjustment in Corporate Liquidity Dynamics for Panel1
Panel B. Summary statistics
High level of aggregation Medium level of aggreg. Low level of aggregation
Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific
R2-adjusted 0.16 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.19 0.38 0.18 0.20 0.38
OV F-test 1.52 0.89 1.08 1.76 1.15 1.17 1.88 1.23 1.22
Notes: OLS estimates of D liquidity, with D the first-difference operator. Based on 4,276 observations (453 firms, 1986-1997). All specifications
include a constant term. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. End-of-previous-period target deviations
(target deviationt-1) are defined using the historical, sophisticated, or specific targets – including return on assets – computed at the high, medium,
or low level of aggregation. Target types and level of aggregation are defined as in Table 3. All other variables are defined as before in Table 1. The
OV F-test evaluates the reported model against one that additionally includes investment, D total debt, D  short debt, D earnings uncertainty, and
D near liquidity. The OV F-test is not significant at either the 1 or 5 percent level.218 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Comparing the adjustment towards historical targets with the adjustment
towards sophisticated targets, we note that at all levels of aggregation there is
a somewhat faster rate of convergence on sophisticated targets. Furthermore,
for historical and sophisticated targets we observe clear differences in the
rate of convergence associated with the level of aggregation. Specifically,
there is faster convergence towards targets that have been computed at lower
levels of aggregation. Although these convergence differentials are statistically
significant, they are not economically so. For any deviation from sophisticated
targets about 58 percent persists for more than 2 years using the high level of
aggregation in constructing the targets, while the comparable number using
the low level of aggregation is 52 percent. In that regard the rate of convergence
implied by these estimates is quite low. Two explanations of this result are
possible. Assuming the long-run targets are measured accurately, the observed
speed of adjustment suggests that these targets do not play a very important
role in a firm’s liquidity management. As a corollary, it suggests that actual
liquidity developments over periods of several years may resemble the picture
that would emerge under passive adjustment behaviour.26 Alternatively, the
targets may be measured inappropriately, for instance because the historical
and sophisticated targets neglect the unspecified parts of firms’ targets as
captured by the firm specific effects. These are included in the specific targets
to which we now turn.
Columns 3, 6, and 9 indeed show that the speed of adjustment increases
considerably when we use specific liquidity targets. At all levels of aggregation,
we now observe convergence at a rate of more than 60 percent per year.
Similar results obtain in the subsamples of Panel1 as well as in Panel2 (refer
to Table A.2. in Appendix 2). The speed of adjustment implied by these
estimates is quite fast; now only about 10 percent of a deviation persists for
more than 2 years. In comparison with the historical and sophisticated target
results, these findings stress the importance of micro-data analysis in the
analysis of liquidity targets and especially target adjustment, since the error
correction effort is likely to be seriously under-estimated when the data are
analyzed at higher levels of aggregation. Here, the link with many
macroeconomic studies of money demand is easily made. There, an
26 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) make a similar point for capital structure adjustment.219 DUTCH CORPORATE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
implausibly low speed of adjustment is often found as well, see for instance
Goldfeld and Sichel (1990). Swamy et al. (1982) already suggest that
aggregation problems may cause these results.
Of course, part of the unobserved heterogeneity in liquidity holdings,
routinely included in the specific targets, may capture firms’ structural inability
to converge towards targets. This argument implies that our adjustment results
using the deviations from specific targets are biased upwards. Putting it more
strongly, if unobserved heterogeneity in liquidity holdings mainly captures
inability to adjust, our convergence results are an artefact of the construction
of the specific targets.
We do not think the bite of this argument is exactly that strong, though.
First, given the inherent nature of liquidity, it is hard to motivate firm-specific
deviations from optimal targets over a period of time of 12 years in Panel1 by
structural adjustment inability. A fortiori this argument holds for our Panel2
results, which cover a period of 21 years. Second, we note that our annual
liquidity adjustment results are qualitatively and quantitatively comparable
to those obtained by Seitz (1993) for quarterly inventory investment
adjustment. Since liquidity should be at least as easy to adjust as inventory
investment, the absolute level of our annual adjustment speeds does not seem
excessive. Even when we consider the speed of adjustment towards the specific
targets as a strict upper bound, the differential with the adjustment speeds
towards historical and sophisticated targets is sufficiently large to worry more
about aggregation issues than the computation of the specific targets.
In addition to target adjustment, the dynamic specification allows for an
investigation of the short-run driving forces of liquidity. The variables
considered in this regard are investment as well as changes in size, total debt,
short debt, return on assets, earnings volatility, average interest rate, and
near liquidity. The reported models result after removing insignificant
coefficients. The collective significance of the omitted variables is summarized
in the OV F-test statistics in panel B of Table 4. For Panel1 only changes in
return on assets, size and the average interest rate have a meaningful impact
on liquidity dynamics. For Panel2 this set additionally includes changes in
near liquidity (see Appendix 2, Table A.2.).
Note first that by variable construction, the estimated impact of a change
in size on the change in liquidity is an elasticity (all other estimated effects220 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
are semi-elasticities). The negative parameter estimates in excess of unity
indicate that changes in size cause more than proportional changes in liquidity
in the opposite direction. This result implies scale economies in liquidity
management. We know from the analysis of liquidity targets that it extends to
the long run.
From the flow of funds variables, advocated as driving forces of liquidity
dynamics by the passive adjustment and the buffer stock views, we find that
changes in return on assets structurally incite changes in liquidity, but
investment does not. Even for return on assets the absolute impact is only
moderate when compared to its long-run effect. Using the estimation results
in columns 3, 6, and 9, we obtain that a change in return on assets that equals
the difference between the 25th and the 75th percentile increases liquidity
holdings – evaluated at the median – by about 1.0 percentage point. Recall
that the long-run effect of the same level shift in return on assets is to increase
targets by more than 1.5 percentage points. Hence we do not find that firms
are more passive in the short run in the sense that incoming funds are routinely
stored in liquid form.
These results sharply contrast with the capital structure results obtained
by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). They find relatively slow target
adjustment in combination with an almost one-to-one effect of flow-of-funds
variables on changes in net or gross debt. Our results are just the opposite,
with substantial target adjustment. The evidence thus suggests that liquidity
and debt are far from perfect substitutes. Consequently, it throws doubt on
the net debt hypothesis.
V. Conclusion
Macroeconomic studies on corporate money demand using stock-
adjustment models typically find extremely low rates of adjustment of observed
money holdings towards targeted levels. While this result may suggest that
money holdings are not actively managed, it may also point towards
aggregation problems. In this paper we argue that informational asymmetries
between firms and financial markets motivate precautionary liquidity holdings
that vary across firms. This makes the accurate measurement of corporate
liquidity targets particularly troublesome in macroeconomic analyses. Within221 DUTCH CORPORATE LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT
the main theme of this paper, if we fail to provide accurate measures of
corporate liquidity targets, we cannot hope to see firms converging rapidly
towards these targets. We therefore analyze liquidity management at the firm
level and demonstrate that meaningful rates of convergence of liquidity
holdings towards targeted levels follow only when liquidity targets are
specified accurately. Our findings are the following.
Our analysis confirms the existence of long-run liquidity targets at the
corporate level. The targets are determined by a small set of economically
plausible variables. The sign of the estimated coefficients is consistent with
theory and earlier empirical literature.
Specifying liquidity targets as simple historical industrial sector averages
associates with rates of annual target convergence that range from 20-24
percent. While this is faster than the adjustment speeds obtained from many
macro-studies of money demand, it still suggests that the half-life time of a
liquidity shock lies beyond 2 years. Nevertheless, aggregation effects are
suggested by the observation that higher rates of target convergence are
obtained when the historical average is constructed at higher-digit industrial
sector levels.
Target convergence results improve to 24-28 percent annually when
liquidity targets are constructed controlling for firm-level (financial)
characteristics as well as year and industrial sector dummies. In this case,
aggregation effects are suggested by the fact that rates of annual target
convergence are highest when the industrial sector dummies are constructed
at the highest-digit level available.
Alternatively, we take into account that a considerable part of the liquidity
decision may remain opaque even after controlling for firm-level (financial)
characteristics. Adjusting the liquidity targets accordingly to capture remaining
unobservable heterogeneity across firms, we find plausibly high annual rates
of target convergence exceeding 60 percent, well in excess of the 10-20 percent
that is usually obtained in macro-studies. Our adjustment results thus lend
credibility to the suspicion raised by Swamy et al. (1982) that aggregation
issues are at the root of the implausibly slow adjustment observed from
analyses using aggregated data. Hence we conclude – in contrast with the
main results obtained from macroeconomic analyses – that corporate liquidity222 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
is an actively managed financial ratio that does not passively adjust to financial
decisions taken elsewhere in the firm.
Since our results derive from a data set that includes only the largest Dutch
firms, one may worry about their general applicability. There is some consensus
that informational problems between firms and financial markets are at least
as relevant for small firms as they are for large firms (e.g. van Ees et al.
1998). Hence insofar as the accurate measurement of liquidity targets in
aggregated data is obscured by informational asymmetries, our conclusions
apply likely to small firms at least with equal force.
Lastly, while we have focussed on the speed with which firms adjust
liquidity holdings towards targeted levels and emphasized the role of the level
of aggregation at which liquidity targets are computed therein, we did not
consider the speed of adjustment as depending on whether firms are initially
above or below their targets and/or whether the are initially close to or far
removed from their targets. Nevertheless, such adjustment asymmetries raise
yet another aggregation issue in corporate liquidity management. Namely at
the aggregate level the adjustment of corporate liquidity holdings to shocks
then depends on the initial distribution of the target deviations across firms
and is possibly nonlinear as a result. We leave the analysis of adjustment
asymmetries in corporate liquidity holdings as an area for future research.
Appendix 1. The Panel Unit Root Test
For the assessment of the order of integration we evaluate the normalized
least squares estimator of the autoregressive coefficient (j) in yit = j yi(t-1) + fit.
The error term, f, may simply be white noise (f = eit), or it may contain firm-
specific intercepts (f C = ai + eit), possibly combined with a common time
trend (f C,T = ai + dt + eit). We test H0: j  = 1 – at the 95% confidence level –
versus the alternative Ha: j  < 1. Harris and Tzavalis (1999) demonstrate that:
for f, () ˆ 1 N j - .. wc ¾¾® ()
2
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where w.c. denotes weak convergence in distribution. The limiting distribution
of this test is shown to be normal for N >100 and T small relative to N,
conditions satisfied by our data.27
In the analysis, when the unit root cannot be rejected while the test includes
firm-specific intercepts and a time trend, we check for a unit root in the first-
differenced series of the respective variable, excluding the time trend from
the test. Similarly, when the unit root cannot be rejected while the test includes
only firm-specific intercepts, we check for a unit root in the first-differenced
series excluding also the firm-specific intercepts.
27 We are aware of the debate in the literature regarding the validity of unit root computation
for panel data. For elaboration on this issue, see for instance the survey by Baltagi and Kao
(2000). We compute unit root test statistics using the Harris and Tzavalis (1999) technique;
a choice that is motivated by the small T character of our panel.
Appendix 2. Liquidity Targets and Target Adjustment Results
Table A1. Level Estimates of Corporate Liquidity for Manufacturing
Firms
Panel A. Manufacturing firms in Panel1
Size 0.040 0.071 0.118
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Total debt -2.274 -2.298 -2.572
(0.288) (0.287) (0.279)
Short debt -0.180 -0.281 -0.368
(0.241) (0.241) (0.235)
Return on assets 3.857 3.926 3.579
(0.528) (0.524) (0.509)
Average interest rate -4.290 -3.964 -3.576
(0.535) (0.543) (0.528)
Earnings uncertainty 2.264 1.202 -0.408
(1.278) (1.307) (1.288)
Sector dummies no 1-digit 2-digit
R2-adjusted 0.138 0.126 0.218224 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Table A1. (Continued) Level Estimates of Corporate Liquidity for
Manufacturing Firms
Panel B. Panel2
Size 0.010 0.080 0.134
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
Total debt -2.435 -2.470 -2.999
(0.397) (0.403) (0.390)
Short debt -0.090 -0.537 -0.191
(0.332) (0.336) (0.333)
Return on assets 4.461 4.537 3.973
(0.665) (0.652) (0.636)
Average interest rate -3.633 -2.978 -2.198
(0.664) (0.663) (0.638)
Earnings uncertainty -1.759 -2.242 -2.567
(1.707) (1.777) (1.714)
Sector dummies no 1-digit 2-digit
R2-adjusted 0.166 0.212 0.300
Notes: Fixed effects estimates of liquidity. The Panels A and B are based on 2,135
observations (197 firms, 1986-1997) and 1,342 observations (84 firms, 1977-1997),
respectively. All variables are defined as before in Table 1. All specifications include a
constant term and year dummies. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and
reported in parentheses. Bruinshoofd and Kool (2004) also report the results for services







































Table A2. Target Adjustment in Corporate Liquidity Dynamics for Manufacturing Firms
Panel A. Manufacturing firms in Panel1
Explanatory  High level of aggregation  Medium level of aggreg .Low level of aggregation
variables Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific
Target -0.25 -0.28 -0.71 -0.26 -0.29 -0.72 -0.28 -0.32 -0.72
deviationt-1 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
D return on 1.94 2.53 3.25 1.94 2.55 3.32 1.94 2.57 3.13
 assetst (0.42) (0.42) (0.36) (0.42) (0.41) (0.36) (0.41) (0.41) (0.36)
D sizet -1.23 -1.29 -0.86 -1.22 -1.29 -0.86 -1.19 -1.27 -0.87
(0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15)
D average -0.31 -0.48 -0.69 -0.30 -0.46 -0.62 -0.29 -0.43 -0.56
 interest ratet (0.45) (0.45) (0.39) (0.45) (0.44) (0.39) (0.45) (0.44) (0.39)
R2-adjusted 0.17 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.19 0.38 0.18 0.20 0.38































Table A2. (Continued) Target Adjustment in Corporate Liquidity Dynamics for Manufacturing Firms
Panel B. Panel2
Explanatory High level of aggregation   Medium level of aggreg.  Low level of aggregation
variables Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific
Target -0.23 -0.27 -0.60 -0.25 -0.29 -0.61 -0.28 -0.33 -0.60
deviationt-1 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
D return on 1.14 1.55 2.00 1.14 1.60 2.02 1.12 1.61 2.02
 assetst (0.49) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.47) (0.44)
D sizet -1.54 -1.58 -1.37 -1.52 -1.56 -1.33 -1.48 -1.51 -1.32
(0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.17)
D average -0.68 -1.05 -1.58 -0.68 -0.98 -1.37 -0.68 -0.87 -1.12







































Table A2. (Continued) Target Adjustment in Corporate Liquidity Dynamics for Manufacturing Firms
Panel B. Panel2
Explanatory  High level of aggregation   Medium level of aggreg.  Low level of aggregation
variables Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific Hist. Soph. Specific
D near -1.16 -1.18 -1.19 -1.19 -1.24 -1.27 -1.19 -1.27 -1.29
 liquidityt (0.49) (0.48) (0.44) (0.49) (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.44)
R2-adjusted 0.18 0.20 0.34 0.18 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.22 0.34
OV F-test 0.68 0.93 1.82 0.71 1.05 1.98 0.64 1.02 2.23
Notes:. OLS estimates of D liquidity, with D the first-difference operator. The Panels A and B are based on 1,938 observations (197 firms, 1986-
1997) and 1,258 observations (84 firms, 1977-1997), respectively. All specifications include a constant term. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and reported in parentheses. End-of-previous-period target deviations (Target deviationt-1) are defined using the historical,
sophisticated, or specific targets – including Return on assets – computed at the high, medium, or low level of aggregation. Target types and level
of aggregation are defined as in Table 3. All other variables are defined as before in Table 1. The OV F-test evaluates the reported model against one
that includes target deviationt-1, D return on assetst, investmentt, D sizet, D average interest ratet, D total debtt, D  short debtt, D earnings uncertaintyt,
and D near liquidityt. The OV F-test is not significant at either the 1 or 5 percent level. Bruinshoofd and Kool (2004) also report the results for
services and miscellaneous firms (the subsamples of Panel1are defined in footnote 12 of the text).228 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
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